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Epistemic Considerations on Extensive-Form Games
by
C¸ag˘ıl Tas¸demir
Adviser: Professor Sergei Artemov
Abstract
In this thesis, we study several topics in extensive-form games. First, we
consider perfect information games with belief revision with players who are
tolerant of each other’s hypothetical errors. We bound the number of hypo-
thetical non-rational moves of a player that will be tolerated by other players
without revising the belief on that player’s rationality on future moves, and
investigate which games yield the backward induction solution.
Second, we consider players who have no way of assigning probabilities to
various possible outcomes, and define players as conservative, moderate and
aggressive depending on the way they choose, and show that all such players
could be considered rational.
We then concentrate on games with imperfect and incomplete information
and study how conservative, moderate and aggressive players might play
such games. We provide models for the behavior of a (truthful) knowledge
manipulator whose motives are not known to the active players, and look
iv
into how she can bring about a certain knowledge situation about a game,
and change the way the game will be played.
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1 Introduction
Game theory studies situations where a person or an agent makes a decision,
but the outcome depends also on the choices of the others. Game theory has
been used to analyze situations such as auctions, mechanism design, voting
systems, bargaining, behavioral economics, linguistics and so on. In all of
these cases, before making a decision, in addition to reasoning about your
own choices, it is important to reason about your opponents’ choices. But
of course your opponents are also capable of doing this reasoning; therefore
you could reason about their beliefs about your reasoning process as well.
Epistemic game theory treats this reasoning process of individuals as an
essential component of the game, and draws its roots from epistemic logic –
the logic of knowledge and belief – and economics.1
Epistemic logic is the branch of logic that deals with formalizing knowledge
and belief. This could be done for a single player, e.g. “Ann knows that Paris
is the capital of France,” or for a group of players, e.g. “Ann believes that
Bob believes that if he goes to the picnic, she will come too.” Epistemic logic
allows us to assert that Ann is aware of the fact that Paris is the capital of
France as in the first example, and that Ann has a belief about Bob’s belief
about her decision as in the second example. This is important because a
player’s decision in a game will be affected by what she knows about the
1Of course one does need to do this back and forth reasoning in order to do game
theory. However, epistemic game theory does take this perspective.
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game and also by her beliefs about other players’ beliefs.
(Non-cooperative) game theory is about strategies for games where players
are considered to be rational, self-interested and calculating. It is therefore
natural to include the behavior of interactive epistemic individuals in the
study of games.
In this thesis, we study several epistemic situations in extensive-form games.
In particular, we
• do a tolerance analysis of perfect information games with belief revision,
• look into the choice functions of players in imperfect information games
where probabilities are not available,
• investigate manipulation of players’ knowledge in imperfect information
games
2
2 Background
A non-cooperative game (just game from now on) is a game where every
player makes her decisions independently from other players. No communi-
cation is allowed among them. Two models used to represent games are:
(1) strategic-form, where games are represented using matrices, and (2)
extensive-form where tree structures are used. In general, to define a finite
game – without the epistemic component for now – we assume:
• a finite number of players,
• a finite number of choices available to each player,
• and a payoff for each player for every possible combination of choices
that could be made by players. (Each such combination is called a
strategy profile.)
Figure 1 shows an example of a strategic-form game with two players:
Bach Stravinsky
Bach 2,1 0,0
Stravinsky 0,0 1,2
Figure 1: A strategic-form game: Bach-Stravinsky
In the Bach-Stravinsky game, the couple wants to go to a concert but the wife
(row) prefers Bach and the husband (column) prefers Stravinsky. But each
3
would rather go together than listen to their favorite composer by themselves.
In each cell, the wife’s payoffs are listed first, and husband’s second.
Figure 2 shows an example of an extensive-form game with two players:
(2, 2)
•

Ann
v1
a
d
(1, 1)
•

Bob
v2
a
d
// //(3, 3)
Figure 2: An extensive-form game
In this game, Ann and Bob are the players, each has a choice of playing
across (a) or down (d) when it is their turn to play. Payoffs are defined on
the terminal nodes (leaves), and the first payoff in each pair belongs to Ann
and the second one to Bob. It is Ann’s turn to play at node v1; she chooses
between playing across and down. If she chooses down, each player gets a
payoff of 2, and the game ends. If she chooses across, the game proceeds
to v2, which belongs to Bob, so it is now Bob’s turn to make a move. If
he chooses down, the game ends, and each player gets a payoff of 1. If he
chooses across, the game ends, and each player gets a payoff of 3.
2.1 Models of Knowledge
In order to be able to talk about the epistemic component of games, we will
first look at various models used to represent knowledge.
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2.1.1 The Set Theoretical Definition of Knowledge
This section relies heavily on [65], [30]. The following model of knowledge
is associated with Hintikka [40]. An information structure is a pair (Ω, P )
where Ω is a set of states. A state is a full description of the world and the
states are considered to be mutually exclusive. P is a function that assigns
to each state ω a non-empty subset of states, P (ω). At state ω ∈ Ω, the
player excludes all the states outside P (ω), and does not exclude any state
in P (ω).
The three properties of information structures that are commonly associated
with the term “rationality” are as follows:
P1. ω ∈ P (ω): The player always considers the true state possible.
P2. If ω′ ∈ P (ω), then P (ω′) ⊆ P (ω): A player cannot hold the view
that there exists a state u such that u ∈ P (ω′) and u /∈ P (ω) if he
believes that ω′ ∈ P (ω).
P3. If ω′ ∈ P (ω), then P (ω′) ⊇ P (ω): If ω′ ∈ P (ω), and there is a
state u ∈ P (ω) that is not in P (ω′), then at ω, a rational player can
conclude, from the fact that he cannot exclude u, that the state is not
ω′, a state at which he would be able to exclude u, contradicting the
assumption that ω′ ∈ P (ω).
The combination of these three properties is equivalent to the assumption
that the information structure is partitional, namely that there exists a par-
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tition of Ω (a collection of mutually exclusive subsets of Ω that completely
cover Ω) such that P (ω) is the set, within the partition, that includes ω.
Let (Ω, P ) be an arbitrary information structure (not necessarily partitional).
The event E ⊆ Ω is known at state ω if P (ω) ⊆ E. This means, at ω the
player knows E if he can exclude all states that are not in E. The statement
the player knows E is identified with all states in which E is known, that
is the set K(E) = {ω : P (ω) ⊆ E}. This definition implies the following
properties:
• If E ⊆ F , then K(E) ⊆ K(F ).
• K(E ∩ F ) = K(E) ∩K(F ).
• K(Ω) = Ω.
Additional properties of the operator K are derived from assumptions about
the information structure.
I1. If we assume P1, we obtain K(E) ⊆ E.
I2. If we assume P2, we obtain K(E) ⊆ K(K(E)).
I3. If we assume P3, we obtain ¬K(E) ⊆ K(¬K(E)).
6
2.1.2 Kripke Model
This model is due to Kripke [44]. A (single)-agent Kripke structure over a set
of atomic propositions AP is a triple 〈Ω, R, pi〉 where Ω is a non-empty set of
states, R ⊆ Ω × Ω is a binary relation (known as the accessibility relation)
and pi : Ω → 2AP is the interpretation function which assigns a truth value
to every atomic proposition at every state ω ∈ Ω. (M,ω) |= ϕ denotes the
notion that the formula ϕ is satisfied by the Kripke structure M = 〈Ω, R, pi〉
at state ω.
If ϕ is atomic, say p, (M,ω) |= p iff pi assigns true to p, i.e. iff p ∈ pi(ω).
For the rest of the formulas, the satisfaction relation is defined inductively
as follows:
• (M,ω) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,ω) 6|= ϕ
• (M,ω) |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff (M,ω) |= ϕ or (M,ω) |= ψ
• (M,ω) |= K(ϕ) iff for all v ∈ Ω such that ωRv, we have (M, v) |= ϕ.
Here K(ϕ) denotes the fact that “ϕ is known.”
We could also derive additional properties about knowledge in Kripke struc-
tures by imposing some constraints on the accessibility relation R. If R is
reflexive, transitive and symmetric (i.e. it is an equivalence relation) we
obtain the following for all ω ∈ Ω and for every formula ϕ:
K1. (M,ω) |= K(ϕ)→ ϕ.
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K2. (M,ω) |= K(ϕ)→ K(K(ϕ))
K3. (M,ω) |= ¬K(ϕ)→ K(¬K(ϕ))
These three properties K1-K3 in Kripke structures correspond to I1-I3 in
information structures respectively. Informally, K1 means that if ϕ is known,
ϕ is true. K2 says that if ϕ is known, then it is known that ϕ is known. K3
says that if ϕ is not known, then it is known that ϕ is not known.
We can go from a Kripke structure to an information structure by taking
P (ω) = {ω′ : (ω, ω′) ∈ R}. Conversely, given an information structure, we
can go to a Kripke structure by letting R = {(ω, ω′) : ω′ ∈ P (ω)}.
Comparison between the two models. Let ϕ be a formula. The event
Eϕ = {ω : (M,ω) |= ϕ} is the set of all states where ϕ is true. EKϕ = K(Eϕ),
which means that every state where K(ϕ) is satisfied in Kripke model is a
state where Eϕ is known in the set-theoretical model of knowledge and vice
versa. The proof stating the equality of two definitions can be found in [65].
Also see [30] and [35].
2.2 Mutual Knowledge and Common Knowl-
edge
The concept of common knowledge is due to Lewis [45] and Aumann [7]. See
[19] for a comparison between Lewis’ and Aumann’s definitions of common
8
knowledge.
To say that a fact is mutual knowledge means that everyone knows it. To
say that a fact is common knowledge means that everyone knows it, everyone
knows that everyone knows it, and so on ad infinitum.
In the set-theoretical model of knowledge, to say that “an event is mutual
knowledge in some state” means in that state every player knows the event.
To say that “an event is common knowledge in some state” means in that
state the event is mutual knowledge, every player knows that the event is
mutual knowledge, every player knows that every player knows that the
event is mutual knowledge and so on. In the case of two players, we say
that an event E is common knowledge in state ω if in state ω player 1 knows
E, player 2 knows E, player 1 knows 2 knows E, player 2 knows player 1
knows E, and so on indefinitely.
Let Ω be the state space, and K1 and K2 two knowledge functions represent-
ing the knowledge of two players, 1 and 2. Ki(E) is the set of states in which
player i knows that event E ⊆ Ω occurs.
Define a third partition of Ω given the two partitions of the players. One
partition refines another if every member of the first partition is a subset of
a member of the second partition. The meet Pm of two partitions P1 and P2
is the partition of Ω such that
(1) both partitions P1 and P2 are refinements of Pm; and
9
(2) there is no refinement of Pm that satisfies (1).
For some event E ⊆ Ω, let ω ∈ Ω be the true state of the world. Then E is
common knowledge in state ω if and only if E contains the member of Pm
that contains ω.
In [7], Aumann showed that given an event E ⊆ Ω, and a state ω ∈ Ω, if
two players have a common probability measure over the set of states Ω and
if their posterior probabilities of event E are common knowledge at state
ω, then they must be equal. The posterior here is defined by conditioning
the player’s prior on her information cell. In [32], Geanakoplos and Sebenius
showed that given a random variable X : Ω→ < - to be thought of as a bet
between two players - and a state ω ∈ Ω it cannot be common knowledge
that both players have strictly positive conditional expectations from the
bet. In [31], Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis showed that two players will
always reach an agreement on their posteriors by announcing them back and
forth. In [53], Parikh and Krasucki showed that when there are more than two
players, communication done in pairs does not lead to common knowledge for
the group. They showed, however, that conditional probabilities will converge
in any fair protocol for communication, i.e., when none of the participants is
blocked from communication.
10
2.3 Game Models, Formally
An N -player extensive form game with the epistemic component consists of
the following:
• A finite set of N players
• A rooted tree, called the game tree
• One payoff for each player that is associated with every terminal (leaf)
node. (i.e. a payoff tuple for every possible play.)
• A partition of the non-terminal nodes of the game tree in N subsets,
one for each player. Each player’s subset of nodes contains the nodes
where it is that player’s turn to make a move.
• Each set of nodes of a player is further partitioned in information sets
such that:
– There is a one-to-one correspondence between outgoing edges of
any two nodes in the same information set.
– Every path from the root to a terminal node can cross each infor-
mation set only once.
• The above description of the game is common knowledge among play-
ers. [39]
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A game is said to be a perfect information game if every member of every
information set is a singleton. Any game without perfect information has
imperfect information. A game is called generic if payoffs are different at
every leaf of the game tree for each player.
To formalize knowledge, Aumann uses the partition model [9]:
A strategy of player i is a function s; that assigns to each node v of i an
action at that node. If we denote the set of i’s strategies by Si, a knowledge
system M (for the given game) is a tuple M = (Ω, K1, ..., KN , s) that consists
of
• a set Ω (the states of the world),
• for each player i, a partition Ki of Ω (i’s information partition).
• and a function s from Ω to ∏i Si
s(ω) represents the N -tuple of the players’ strategies at the state ω. si is
assumed to be measurable with respect to Ki, which means that players know
their own strategy.
We will let P denote the function that maps non-terminal nodes to players
to indicate the player moving at a given node.
Example 2.1 This example is due to Stalnaker [71], and it has been for-
malized by Halpern [36]. We will discuss it in detail in Chapter 3.
In this game,
12
(2, 2)
•

Ann
v1
a
d
(1, 1)
•

Bob
v2
a
d
//
(0, 0)
•

Ann
v3
a
d
// (3, 3)//
Figure 3: Stalnaker’s game
• We have two players: Ann and Bob.
• The game tree is as depicted in Figure 3. The game starts at node v1,
and at each node, the player whose turn it is to play has two strategies
available to her/him: across (a) and down (d).
• At each terminal node, the first number in the pair denotes Ann’s
payoff, and the second one denotes Bob’s if the game reaches this node.
• Nodes v1 and v3 belong to Ann, and node v2 belongs to Bob.
• If this is a perfect information game, then at each node v the player
who moves at v knows that the play is at v.
The epistemic component of this game is given as follows:
• There are five states of the world: Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5}
• The function s, that maps each state to a strategy profile is given
as follows: s(ω1) = dda, s(ω2) = ada, s(ω3) = add, s(ω4) = aaa,
s(ω5) = aad.
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• Information partitions of Ann and Bob are:
KAnn = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}, {ω5}}, and
KBob = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}, {ω4}, {ω5}}
The given information partitions tell us that at all states Ann knows what
state she is at, whereas Bob cannot distinguish between states ω2 and ω3,
which means that he does not know the action that Ann will select at node
v3.
14
3 Tolerance Analysis of Perfect Infor-
mation Games with Belief Revision
The work described in this chapter has appeared in [72].
3.1 Backward Induction
Backward induction is a common solution concept in extensive-form games.
In generic perfect information games, the process is as follows:2 Start with
the non-terminal nodes whose children are only the terminal nodes (leaves).
At each of these non-terminal nodes, choose the move, say m, that leads to
a better payoff, say p, for the player who owns that node (m exists since we
assume the game is generic); eliminate all the other moves originating from
the non-terminal node; and eliminate the payoffs they yield as well, and
replace the said node with the payoff p, therefore making it a terminal-node.
Note that this is done for all non-terminal nodes whose children are only the
terminal nodes. Now, iterate the procedure until there is one node (which is
going to be a leaf) left. This gives us the BI outcome. [1]
If we look at our example from Figure 3, backward induction works as follows:
The only non-terminal node whose children are only terminal nodes is v3. So
2Note that the backward induction process is more difficult to define on games with
imperfect information.
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we first decide what Ann would play at v3, then taking her move into account,
we look at what Bob would play at the next such node, that is v2, and finally
taking all of this into account we check what Ann would do at v1.
3.2 Perfect Information Games with Common
Knowledge of Rationality
Aumann proved that in games of perfect information, common knowledge
of rationality yields backward induction [9]. He calls a player rational if he
chooses rationally at all his nodes, even at the ones that he knows will not
be reached because he himself has precluded them by a previous choice. In
a subsequent paper [1], where a new notion of rationality is introduced, this
older version is referred to as strategic rationality.
This (first) approach has been criticized, in particular by Stalnaker in [71],
who showed that if players are allowed to revise their beliefs in each other’s
rationality in response to surprising information, backward induction does
not follow from common knowledge of rationality.
In [36], Halpern showed that the difference between the two approaches lies
in how the following counterfactual statement is interpreted: “If the player
were to reach vertex v, then she would be rational at vertex v.” It should
also be noted that Stalnaker has no problem with the formal correctness of
Aumann’s proof. Aumann’s framework in [9] talks about knowledge and has
16
no room for belief revision. Stalnaker, on the other hand, allows players to
revise their beliefs after a non-rational move by another player, even if that
mentioned non-rational move is hypothetical.3
Let us consider the game in Figure 3 which is due to Stalnaker and which
Halpern uses to point out the difference in Aumann’s and Stalnaker’s argu-
ments.
We will first examine the backward induction solution: At node v3, Ann is
better off playing across since this move gives her a payoff of 3, which is
more than the payoff of 0 she would get if she played down. Taking this into
account, Bob is better off playing across at node v2 if the game reaches this
node. Playing across would result in a payoff of 3 for him, which is better
than the payoff of 1 he would get if he played down. Taking all of this into
account, Ann is better off playing across at v1 because she prefers the game
to reach v2 (and then eventually to v3) in which case her payoff would be
a 3, compared to ending the game immediately by playing down at v1 and
getting a payoff of 2. So the backward solution would be (aaa) where the
players play across at the node(s) where it is their turn to make a move.
Let us look at the same game from Stalnaker’s perspective: Assume that it is
common knowledge that the actual state is (dda). This means that Ann plays
down (d) at node v1, Bob plays down (d) at v2, and Ann plays across (a) at
v3, and that all of this is common knowledge between Ann and Bob. This
3It would be worth pointing out that other approaches besides Stalnaker’s are possible.
See [67] for an example.
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means that all moves are known at the beginning of the game. The question
is whether (dda), which is different than the backward induction solution
(aaa), could follow from assuming common knowledge of rationality. Also
see [51] for an extended discussion on this.
At (dda), Ann is rational4 at v1, because Bob is playing d at v2. (Remember
that the state (dda) is common knowledge.) At v2, Bob revises his belief on
Ann’s rationality, due to her hypothetical non-rational move (or the surpris-
ing information) a at v1, and considers Ann’s playing d at v3 also possible as
a result of this belief revision. He plays d and he is rational. Ann is rational
at v3 by playing a.
While Halpern laid out the differences in Aumann’s and Stalnaker’s ar-
guments, Artemov in [4] showed that in perfect information games with
Stalnaker-style belief revision setting, if players maintain their beliefs in each
other’s rationality in all, even hypothetical situations, i.e., if there is so-
called robust knowledge of rationality in the game, then the only solution of
the game is backward induction. That is, if Bob does not revise his beliefs
on Ann’s rationality at v2, (dda) cannot be the solution of the game in the
presence of common knowledge of rationality. Baltag, Smets and Zvesper
also make a similar point in [10].
In a recent work [1], Arieli and Aumann replaced the common “knowledge”
4We have not yet given a formal definition of rationality. At this point, it could be
thought of as follows: A rational player will not choose a strategy if she knows that there
is another strategy that will bring her a better payoff.
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of rationality requirement of [9] by common “strong belief” of rationality, and
also replaced the “strategies” by “plans,” which specify only what a player
does at unprecluded nodes. Recall that a strategy of a player is a function
that assigns to each of that player’s nodes an action at the nodes that he is
active. A plan of a player is the restriction of a strategy si of that player to
the set of the nodes that si does not preclude by an action at a previous node.
The nodes that are not allowed by a plan are said to be precluded. A player
is called plan-rational if at each of his unprecluded nodes h, he has no plan
that he believes, conditional on h being reached, yields him a higher payoff
than his current plan. A player is said to strongly believe a proposition X if
for each node h that belongs to the said player, either he believes X at node
h or X is inconsistent with h being reached. Given these definitions, they
show that common strong belief of plan rationality entails the BI outcome.
[1]
Epistemic foundations of backward induction has been studied extensively
in [5], [10], [27], [59], [67].
3.3 Game Models and Rationality
Halpern extends Aumann models to represent N -player extensive form games
with perfect information where players can revise their beliefs [36]. An ex-
tended model is a tuple M ′ = (Ω, K1, ..., KN , s, f) where
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• Ω is a set of states of the world,
• Ki is the information partition of player i,
• s maps each state ω ∈ Ω to a strategy profile s(ω) = (s1, ..., sN) where
si is player i’s strategy at state ω.
• Function f , called selection function, maps state-vertex pairs to states.
Informally, f(ω, v) = ω′ means that ω′ is the closest state to ω where
vertex v is reached.
Let hvi (s) denote player i’s payoff if strategy profile s is played starting at
vertex v. Again, let P be the function that maps non-terminal nodes to
players to indicate the player moving at a given node.
Definition 3.1 Player i is Aumann-rational, or A-rational, at vertex v in
state ω if for all strategies si such that si 6= si(ω),
hvi (s(ω
′)) ≥ hvi (s−i(ω′), si)
for some ω′ ∈ Ki(ω) where s−i(ω′) denotes the strategy profile of the players
other than i at state ω′.
Note that according to this definition, a player is rational as long as her
strategy in the current state ω yields her a payoff at least as good as any of
her other strategies in some state that she considers possible at ω.
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Also note that we assume that every player knows her own strategy, so
si(ω) = si(ω
′) if ω′ ∈ Ki(ω).
Definition 3.2 Player i is Stalnaker-rational, or S-rational, at vertex v
in state ω if i is A-rational at v in state f(ω, v).
Substantive rationality is rationality (A-rationality or S-rationality, depend-
ing on which framework we are working with) at all vertices of the game tree.
The formalization of selection functions is due to Halpern [36], and the main
idea of a selection function f is for each state ω and vertex v to indicate
the epistemically closest state f(ω, v) to ω in which v is reached. Halpern
assumes that the selection function f satisfies the following requirements:
F1. Vertex v is reached in f(ω, v).
F2. If v is reached in ω, then f(ω, v) = ω.
F3. s(f(ω, v)) and s(ω) agree on the subtree below v.
3.4 Tolerating Hypothetical Errors
We would like to investigate the case where it is common knowledge that
players are rational (in Stalnaker’s sense) at all vertices of the game tree,
and they tolerate n hypothetical non-rational moves of other players. So if
n = 0, we would end up with Stalnaker’s framework where after 1 error,
players revise their beliefs.
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Our model will extend Halpern’s so that the selection function will now
satisfy an additional requirement F4n (given below) in order to represent the
n-tolerance of the players. We will give the definitions of an error-vertex and
the condition F4n simultaneously.
The following definition extends Aumann’s rationality to hypothetical moves.
Definition 3.3 We say that a move m at vertex v in state ω is rational if
player i = P (v) is Aumann-rational at v in some state ω′ which has the same
profile as some ω˜ ∈ Ki(ω) except, possibly, for the move m which is plugged
into v.5
Definition 3.4 Given a state ω, a vertex v is an n-error vertex, if n is
the least natural number ≥ 0 such that each player makes not more than n
non-rational moves (possibly hypothetical) at vertices v′ from the root to v in
states f(ω, v′).
Obviously, the root vertex is always 0-error. If there are 2k moves from the
root to v, then each player makes ≤ k moves there and v is at most a k-error
vertex. Other examples will be discussed later in this section.
The following condition reflects the idea of n-tolerance which is built-in into
the selection function: sets of future scenarios are not revised after ≤ n
(possibly hypothetical) non-rational moves of each player.
5By “a move m being plugged into v”, we mean that the move at vertex v is m rather
than the one that is dictated by ω˜.
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Condition F4n. For each state ω and k-error vertex v with
k ≤ n and i = P (v), if ω′ ∈ Ki(f(ω, v)), then there exists a state
ω′′ ∈ Ki(ω) such that s(ω′) and s(ω′′) agree on the subtree below
v.
Halpern uses a similar condition to model Aumann’s framework, which says
that players consider at least as many strategies possible at ω as at f(ω, v);
and this applies to all vertices in the game tree. Our condition F4n says the
same thing for ≤ n-error vertices, hence limiting the tolerance level in the
game to n (possibly hypothetical) non-rational moves per player. In other
words, in an n-tolerance game, players will not revise their beliefs about
rationality for the first n hypothetical non-rational moves of those players.
Example 3.1 We repeat Stalnaker’s game tree from Chapter 2.3 below. The
following extended model is the same as in Example 2.1.
(2, 2)
•

Ann
v1
a
d
(1, 1)
•

Bob
v2
a
d
//
(0, 0)
•

Ann
v3
a
d
// (3, 3)//
Figure 4: Stalnaker’s game, repeated
The strategy profiles are as follows:
• s1 = (dda)
23
• s2 = (ada)
• s3 = (add)
• s4 = (aaa): this is the BI solution.
• s5 = (aad)
The extended model is M1 = (Ω, KAnn, KBob, s, f) where
• Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5}
• KAnn = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}, {ω5}}
• KBob = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}, {ω4}, {ω5}}
• s(ωj) = sj for j = 1− 5
• f(ω1, v2) = ω2, f(ω1, v3) = ω4, f(ω2, v3) = ω4, f(ω3, v3) = ω5, and
f(ω, v) = ω for all other ω and v.
It is assumed that the actual state is ω1 with s(ω1) = (dda), and this is
commonly known to players. Let us check which vertices are erroneous.
In state ω1:
• v1 is a 0-error vertex.
• v2 is a 1-error vertex since Ann’s move from v1 to v2 is not rational in
ω1. She only considers (dda) possible at this node and changing the
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move at v1 to a results in (ada), which would make Ann non-rational
at v1. This is because (dda) would bring her a payoff of 2 whereas with
(ada) she would only get 1.
• v3 is a 1-error vertex, by an easy combinatorial argument. Ann was
not rational at v1, so v3 is at least 1-error vertex. However, it is at
most 1-error, since the move at v2 is made by Bob, and it cannot
change the maximum of error counts at v3. However, let us check that
Bob is rational in moving from v2 to v3 at f(ω1, v2) = ω2 = ada. In
(ada), Bob considers both (ada) and (add) possible, and plugging the
hypothetical move a into vertex v2 would result in strategy profile (aaa)
that corresponds to state ω4 in which Bob is rational at v2.
3.5 Belief Revision with Tolerance
Example 3.2 Let us consider the game in Figure 3 one more time. Note
that in this game, with the model M1, in the presence of common knowledge
of substantive rationality the realized strategy profile, i.e., (dda), is different
than the backward induction solution (aaa). We will also assume common
knowledge of substantive rationality, and show that (dda) cannot be the
solution of the 1-tolerant version of this game.
Since players are 1-tolerant, the selection function f should satisfy the con-
dition F4n with n = 1. This means that the first hypothetical error of each
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player is tolerated. In particular, even if Ann and Bob make one hypothet-
ical error each, those will be tolerated and beliefs in rationality will not be
revised.
Therefore in a 1-tolerance game, if we assume that the state (dda) is common
knowledge, we need to consider only three strategy profiles:
• s1 = (dda): This is the original strategy profile which is commonly
known.
• s2 = (ada): This is the revised state at v2.
• s3 = (aaa): This is the revised state at v3.
The extended 1-tolerance game model is M2 = (Ω, KAnn, KBob, s, f) where
• Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}
• KAnn = KBob = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}}
• s(ωj) = sj for j = 1− 3
• f(ω1, v2) = ω2, f(ω1, v3) = ω3, f(ω2, v3) = ω3, and f(ω, v) = ω for all
other ω and v.
The actual state is ω1 with s(ω1) = (dda). Let us count the number of errors
in this model.
• v1 is 0-error.
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• v2 is 1-error, since in order to (hypothetically) get from v1 to v2, Ann has
to make a non-rational move, by the same reasoning as in Example 3.1.
• v3 is again 1-error by trivial combinatorial reasons, as before. Moreover,
Bob’s hypothetical move from v2 to v3 is rational at ω2, by the same
reasoning as before.
Condition F41 is obviously met, so this is a 1-tolerant model in which strategy
profile (dda) is common knowledge. We’ll see, however, that the substantive
S-rationality condition is violated in this model, namely, Bob is not rational
at v2. Indeed, S-rationality in ω1 at v2 reduces to (Aumann-)rationality in
f(ω1, v2) at v2, i.e., in ω2 at v2. Since s(ω2) = (ada), the real move at v2 is
down which is not rational because of the better alternative across.
Example 3.3 Figure 5 shows an extensive form 1-tolerance game of length
5. Assuming common knowledge of substantive rationality, we will show that
there exists a non-BI solution, namely (dddda).
(4, 4)
•

Ann
v1
a
d
(3, 3)
•

Bob
v2
a
d
//
(2, 2)
•

Ann
v3
a
d
//
(1, 1)
•

Bob
v4
a
d
//
(0, 0)
•

Ann
v5
a
d
// //(5, 5)//
Figure 5: Stalnaker’s game: 5-move version
The strategy profiles are as follows:
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• s1 is the strategy profile (dddda)
• s2 is the strategy profile (addda)
• s3 is the strategy profile (aadda)
• s4 is the strategy profile (aaada)
• s5 is the strategy profile (aaaaa)
• s6 is the strategy profile (aaaad)
• s7 is the strategy profile (aaadd).
Consider the extended model A = (Ω, KAnn, KBob, s, f) where
• Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6, ω7}
• KAnn = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4}, {ω5}, {ω6}, {ω7}}
• KBob = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, {ω4, ω7}, {ω5}, {ω6}}
• s(ωj) = sj for j = 1− 7
• f(ω1, v2) = ω2, f(ω1, v3) = ω3, f(ω1, v4) = ω4, f(ω1, v5) = ω5,
f(ω2, v3) = ω3, f(ω2, v4) = ω4, f(ω2, v5) = ω5,
f(ω3, v4) = ω4, f(ω3, v5) = ω5,
f(ω4, v5) = ω5,
f(ω7, v5) = ω6, and
f(ω, v) = ω for all other ω and v.
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The actual state is (dddda). Let us count the number of errors.
• v1 is 0-error.
• Ann is not rational moving from v1 to v2 in state f(ω1, v2) = ω2. Indeed,
s(ω2) = (addda), hence Ann moves across at v1 while knowing that Bob
will play down at v2 (therefore subscribing to a payoff of 3 instead of
4). Hence v2 is 1-error.
• Bob, is not rational when moving from v2 to v3 in state f(ω1, v3) = ω3.
Indeed, s(ω3) = (aadda), hence Bob moves across at v2 while knowing
that Ann will play down at v3. Hence v3 is 1-error by both Ann’s and
Bob’s accounts.
• Ann is not rational moving from v3 to v4 in state f(ω1, v4) = ω4. Indeed,
s(ω4) = (aaada), hence Ann moves across at v3 while knowing that Bob
will play down at v4. Hence v4 is 2-error on Ann’s account.
• v5 is 2-error by trivial combinatorial reasons. However, it is worth
mentioning that Bob is rational when moving across from v4 to v5.
To secure 1-tolerance, we have to check the conclusion of F41 at all 0-error
and 1-error vertices, in this case at vertices v1, v2, and v3 which is quite
straightforward. Indeed, selection function f does not add new indistin-
guishable states at these vertices, but just makes the corresponding vertex
accessible in the revised state.
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Since KAnn(ω1) = KBob(ω1) = {ω1}, everything that is true at ω1 will be
common knowledge to Ann and Bob at that state. To check substantive
rationality at ω1, we need to check players’ rationality in the following situ-
ations:
S = {(ω1, v1), (ω2, v2), (ω3, v3), (ω4, v4), (ω5, v5)}
• Ann is rational at (ω1, v1). Since Bob plays d at vertex v2, d is the
rational move for Ann at (ω1, v1).
• Bob is rational at (ω2, v2). At (ω2, v2), Bob thinks Ann was not rational
at v1 but since we assume that each player tolerates one error, he does
not revise his beliefs on her future rationality (yet). So he looks at what
will happen at node v3. Seeing that Ann is playing d at that node, he
himself chooses to play d at v2, which is the rational thing to do. So
we can conclude that Bob is rational at (ω2, v2).
• Ann is rational at (ω3, v3). At (ω3, v3), Ann thinks Bob was not rational
at node v2. This time Ann tolerates Bob’s error and does not revise
her beliefs about his future rationality. She looks at what will happen
at node v4. Seeing that Bob is playing d at that node, she chooses to
play d at v3, which is the rational thing to do.
• Bob is rational at (ω4, v4). At (ω4, v4), Bob thinks that Ann was not
rational at node v3. Since he will not tolerate one more error, he revises
his beliefs and takes into the account the possibility of Ann’s playing d
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at v5. In this case, it is rational for him to play d.
• Ann is rational at (ω5, v5) regardless of her beliefs about Bob.
If we count the length of the game as the number of moves in its longest path
in the game tree, this example shows that, assuming common knowledge of
rationality and 1-tolerance, there exists a game of length 5, where a non-BI
solution is realized.
Theorem 3.1 In perfect information games with common knowledge of ra-
tionality and of n-tolerance, each game of length less than 2n+ 3 yields BI.
Proof: Let m ≤ 2n + 2. We will show that all m-tolerant games are BI-
games. At a vertex that at which the last move of a given path is made (such
vertex is reachable from the root in ≤ 2n + 1 steps), Aumann-rationality
yields the move that is dictated by the backward induction solution. Any
other vertex v is reachable from the root in ≤ 2n steps. So there are at most
2n previous nodes prior to reaching v. Since no player makes two moves in
a row, each player makes at most n moves prior to v, and even if all of these
moves were erroneous, player i = P (v) will tolerate them and do not revise
his assumption of the common belief of rationality till the end of the game.
By Artemov’s argument in [4], this yields BI solution for the rest of the game.
2
Something puzzles me about this: Consder a Centipede game where the BI
outcome is that player 1 goes out at the first node. Suppose that the player
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makes a “mistake” and stayes in, but no further mistakes. I agree that the BI
solution is played from then on, but how can you guarantee the BI outcome
is reached?
Theorem 3.2 The upper bound 2n + 3 from Theorem 1 is tight. Namely,
for each n, there exists a perfect information game with common knowledge
of rationality and of n-tolerance of length 2n+ 3 which does not yield BI.
Proof: Consider the straightforward generalization of Example 3.3 (which
has length 5 = 2× 1 + 3, i.e., corresponds to n = 1) to an arbitrary n as in
Figure 6. In particular, the profile
(dd . . . da)
is assumed to be commonly known and players to be n-tolerant.
The same reasoning as in Example 3.3 shows that this profile (dd . . . da) is
both rational and not BI. Since the strategy profile (dd . . . da) is commonly
known, and players are n-tolerant, Ann and Bob will not revise their beliefs
in each other’s rationality during the first 2n moves. The move at v2n+1
belongs to Ann. She is playing d according to the strategy profile (dd . . . da)
and she is rational (because Bob is playing d at v2n+2). However, in order
to decide whether Bob is rational at v2n+2, we need to take into account
Ann’s hypothetical non-rational moves a to reach v2n+2, and there are n+ 1
such moves. Therefore Bob may revise his beliefs on her rationality, consider
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Ann’s playing d possible at v2n+3, and this makes Bob’s move d at v2n+2
rational. At the very last vertex, Ann is also rational since she plays a. 2
first 2n moves︷ ︸︸ ︷
(2n+ 2,
2n+ 2)
•

Ann
v1
a
d
(2n+ 1,
2n+ 1)
•

Bob
v2
a
d
//
(2n, 2n)
•

Ann
v3
...
...
d
//
(2, 2)
•//

Ann
v2n+1
a
d
(1, 1)
•

//
(0, 0)
•

Bob
v2n+2
a
d
//Ann
v2n+3
a
d
// (2n+ 3,
2n+ 3)
Figure 6: Stalnaker’s game: Generalized version of length 2n+ 3
3.6 Discussion and Future Work
Our findings indicate that for a given tolerance level n, short games, up to
length 2n + 2 are Aumann’s games, i.e., yield backward induction solutions
only. Longer games of length 2n+3 and greater can show Stalnaker’s behavior
based on the revision of player’s belief of each other’s rationality.
What does it say about games with human players who can be tolerant
to some limited degree? One more parameter intervenes here: the nested
epistemic depth of reasoning, which is remarkably limited for humans [34] to
small numbers like one – two. In order to calculate the backward induction
solution, players have to possess the power of nested epistemic reasoning
of the order of the length of the game. So, realistically, the BI analysis
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of human players applies to rather short games. According to Theorem 3.1,
assuming 1-tolerance of players (which we regard as a meaningful assumption
for humans) the only solution is backward induction.
However, in the games we have discussed in this chapter, with the given
definition of rationality of hypothetical moves and common knowledge of
a non-BI strategy profile as the actual state, we see no way to interpret
the hypothetical errors as a move (signal) where the player who makes the
hypothetical error is trying to reach the pareto-optimal payoff pair, which is
the BI solution. A logical next step could be to look into this direction. This
is similar to forward induction. See [13] and [43] for related discussions.
Another possible direction would be to incorporate trembling-hand equilib-
rium into our framework without making use of probabilities. Trembling-
hand equilibrium is a model in which there is some small probability that a
player will “tremble” and make an unintended, possibly non-rational move
[69].
Stalnaker’s players are zero-tolerant and give up their “knowledge of rational-
ity” in hypothetical reasoning after the first hypothetical non-rational move
of other players. Aumann’s players are infinitely tolerant, and never give
up their knowledge of rationality. A natural problem of what happens in
between, when the level of tolerance to hypothetical errors is a parameter of
the game is discussed is this chapter.
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4 Choice under Uncertainty
This chapter discusses how players might choose their strategies in imperfect
information games. It is joint work with Parikh and Witzel, and has appeared
in [57].
Recall that a game that does not have perfect information is an imperfect
information game. Consider a player choosing between two acts A and B,
whose outcomes are uncertain and depend on factors that the player does
not fully know. However, for each pair of possible outcomes the player does
know how she would choose. We would like to investigate whether the player
then has a way of choosing between the acts which will work at least some
of the time.
Suppose a player is in a situation of uncertainty where she has to choose
between two moves L and R but does not know for sure what the outcome
will be with either choice. Assume moreover that the player has no way
of assigning probabilities to the various outcomes. In the absence of such
information, how might the player choose?
One option is the maxmin route. A player can choose L if the worst possible
outcome caused by L is better than the worst outcome with R. We will
describe such a player as conservative. However, an ambitious player may
choose R if the best outcome under R is better than the best outcome with
L. We will describe such a player as aggressive. If we had cardinal utilities
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and probabilities we would have used the expressions risk averse and risk
loving.
It is clear then that in the same situation, an aggressive player with the
same options and the same preferences as a conservative one may still make
a different choice. Some people never buy lottery tickets on the ground that
the worst outcome under buying, namely losing one’s money, is worse than
the certain outcome (no gain, no loss) under not buying. But those who do
buy such tickets are clearly judging by the best outcome.
In this chapter we will assume that utilities are ordinal. In other words,
between any two choices a and b, the agent may be neutral, prefer a or
prefer b. Numbers u(a), u(b) can be assigned to a and b so that u(a) < u(b)
iff b is preferred to a. However, ordinal utilities are preserved by all order
preserving transformations. If c is preferred to b and b to a (which we may
write c > b > a) then there is no difference between utility assignments to
a, b, c of 1, 2, 10 or 1, 9, 10.
If we had access to cardinal utilities and a subjective probability were avail-
able, we could have used expected value as a basis for comparison of choices.
However, these tools are not always available. Suppose for instance, that a
voter has clear preferences among three candidates A, B and C. She prefers
A to B to C. She still might not have a clear intuition in response to the
question, “Do you prefer B or a 50-50 chance of A versus C?” Such choices
between bets have been used by both Ramsey and de Finetti [61, 28], but
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they do not always make sense to the person being asked. And without clear
and consistent answers to such questions, we cannot have access to subjec-
tive probabilities (or to cardinal utilities). Savage in [68] imposes rationality
conditions on choices between bets in order to derive subjective probabilities
and utilities.
The general issue is that a player in uncertainty is choosing between two sets
(or sequences) of payoffs. The payoffs with L are, say, a1, a2, ..., ak and the
payoffs with R are b1, b2, ..., bm such that a1 > a2 > ... > ak and b1 > b2 >
... > bm. A conservative player chooses L over R if ak is preferred to bm.
An aggressive player chooses R over L if b1 is better than a1. In addition
to conservative and aggressive players, we can also consider moderate players
who try to find the middle way, staying away from the maximum or the
minimum.
More generally, let a player use a choice function f to represent a sequence of
outcomes by a single element. f takes a finite ordered set (list from now on)6
and chooses a representative element from that list. A conservative player
uses the minimum, an aggressive player uses the maximum, and a moderate
player uses (say) the median. (In case the number of elements is even we can
use the higher of the two medians.)
If the choice function f is used then we let X  Y iff f(X) ≤ f(Y ), where
6[66] also discuss choosing from lists, but their notion of list is different from ours. We
are assuming that before choosing a list has already been arranged as (a1, ..., an) so that
ai < ai+1 for all i ≤ n. They allow for the possibility that the same objects are offered in
different orders and different elements may be chosen from the same set.
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X, Y are finite lists of outcomes. It is easily seen that the relation  defined
this way will be transitive, although it is not anti-symmetric.
The function f should satisfy some rationality conditions.
4.1 Suitable Choice Functions
Definition 4.1 A choice function f is suitable if it has the properties below.
1. If lists A and B are isomorphic by an order preserving map g, then
g(f(A)) = f(B).
2. If list A is augmented to a list B by adding an element x which exceeds
all elements of A, then f(B) ≥ f(A).
3. If list A is augmented to a list B by adding an element x which is less
than all elements of A, then f(B) ≤ f(A).
4. If lists A and B overlap but all elements in B−A exceed those in A∩B
which exceeds all elements in A−B, then f(A) ≤ f(B).
Note that conditions (2) and (3) together imply (for finite lists) condition (4)
which implies both (2) and (3).
Let us define s(n) = f({1, ..., n}).
Because of the order isomorphism property (1) above, the function s com-
pletely characterizes f , for any finite list is order isomorphic to some list
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{1,...,n}. By abuse of language we will say that s is suitable iff the cor-
responding f is. Note that s takes a single natural number as argument
whereas f takes an ordered list.
Theorem 4.1 s is suitable iff
s(n) ≤ s(n+ 1) ≤ s(n) + 1 for all n. (∗)
Proof:
Necessity: Note that f({1, ..., n}) ≤ f({1, ..., n + 1}) since the second list
is obtained from the first by adding a larger element. This yields s(n) ≤
s(n+ 1).
Also, f({1, ..., n+ 1}) ≤ f({2, ..., n+ 1}) since the first list is obtained from
the second by adding a smaller element. But the second value is just s(n) +
1. This follows from the isomorphism condition as the list {2, ..., n + 1} is
isomorphic to the list {1, ..., n} via the function g(n) = n + 1. So we get
s(n+ 1) ≤ s(n) + 1.
Before proving sufficiency we remark that (*) yields s(n + m) ≤ s(n) + m.
This is easily shown using induction on m.
Sufficiency: Suppose that s satisfies s(n) ≤ s(n + m) ≤ s(n) + m for all
m,n. It is easy to see that the first three conditions above will hold for the
corresponding f .
To see that the fourth condition also holds, suppose that list A is {1, ..., n}
and list B is {m + 1, ..., n, ...,m + r} so that the elements 1, ...,m are in A
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and below B, and elements n+ 1, ...,m+ r are elements of B above A. Since
we assume overlap as in property (4), we may assume that m+ r is at least
n.
Now f(B) = s(r) + m since B consists of r elements in order but shifted
rightward from 1, ..., r by an amount of m. Since n ≤ r + m, we have
s(n) ≤ s(r + m) ≤ s(r) + m. Now f(A) = s(n), and f(B) = s(r) + m. So
indeed f(A) ≤ f(B). 2
This shows that there are uncountably many suitable choice functions since
g(n) = s(n+ 1)− s(n) can be zero or one, infinitely many times. Since there
are not that many human beings, the conservative humans with s(n) = 1,
aggressive humans with s(n) = n and moderate humans with s(n) approxi-
mately equal to n/2 are the typical cases to appear in practice.
Theorem 4.2 The minimum, the median and the maximum are all suitable
choice functions (SCFs) in the sense above (and the corresponding notions of
f -rationality are equivalent to being conservative, moderate, and aggressive
respectively).
Proof: It is obvious that the median, the maximum and the minimum are
preserved by isomorphism. We check the fourth condition in Definition 4.1
just for the median.
Suppose that X and Y overlap so that X is a1 > a2 > ... > ak > b1 > ... > bm
and Y is b1 > b2 > ... > bm > c1 > ... > cp. X − Y is above Y −X. Clearly
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if the median of X is an ai or the median of Y is a ci then we are done. If
both medians are bi and bj respectively. Since bi is the median of X, we have
i + k = m − i + 1. Similarly, because bj is the median of Y , we have and
j = p + m− j + 1. Thus we get 2i = m + 1− k and 2j = p + m + 1. Thus
i < j and bi > bj. 2
Note that we could also conclude this from Theorem 4.1 since the median
med(n) on {1, ..., n} obviously satisfies the condition med(n) ≤ med(n+1) ≤
med(n) + 1 for all n.
Definition 4.2 Given an SCF f , an f -rational player is a player who, when
uncertain between lists X and Y of alternatives, always picks X if f(X) >
f(Y ).
Sometimes we can speak of one strategy being dominated by another. Sup-
pose that there is a set of possible worlds {ω1, ..., ωn} and for each world ωi
actions L and R yield payoffs pi and qi respectively. Then we say that L is
dominated by R if for each i, pi ≤ qi and for at least one i, pi < qi.7 In such
7The notion of strictly dominated strategy that we intend is subjective. Thus we actually
mean a strategy which is dominated by another pure strategy that the agent considers
possible at the time of play. Consider the following scenario: Suppose Ann is giving a
dinner party and she has to make a decision between serving two dinners d and d′. Assume
that three guests have been invited, and guest 1 and guest 2 prefer d to d′ whereas guest
3 not only prefers d′ to d but also, he is allergic to one of the ingredients in d. If Ann is a
conservative agent, she will serve d′ to avoid the worst case scenario. Now let’s say guest 3
is not going to the dinner party but Ann is unaware of this. In this case she will still serve
d′ even though it is a strictly dominated strategy if only guests 1 and 2 will be there. But
since guest 3 was expected to show up in the original scenario and Ann does not know
that he is not coming, we do not consider serving d′ as strictly dominated in this example.
Note that the notion of a dominated strategy makes sense only when two choices lead to
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a situation, the number of possible outcomes with either L or R will be the
same, namely n.
It is easily seen that all three kinds of players, conservative, moderate and
aggressive will never pick a strictly dominated strategy.
4.2 The IIA Condition
Definition 4.3 An SCF f satisfies the IIA condition whenever a = f(X),
Y ⊆ X, and a ∈ Y then a = f(Y ).
This definition occurs in [48] but the version we give is not the only one in
the literature. (See [62]). Of course there is no particular reason why IIA
should be obeyed in such a case. The role of f(X) is to play the role of
an element which in some sense represents X rather than that of a most
preferred element of X. Thus the median is probably the closest to the
expected value which we tend to use when we do have cardinal utilities and
a subjective probability.
Informally the IIA condition says that if an element x is chosen from a list
S and x ∈ T ⊆ S then x must be chosen from T . The idea here is that if x
is the best element of S and is in a subset T then it is also the best element
of T .
different results but over the same set of possible worlds. When one is choosing between
L and R in a game tree, the two actions lead to different sets of nodes and the notion of
domination does not have an obvious intuitive meaning.
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The choice functions we have spoken about do not choose the best elements
of a list but rather typical elements. Thus the intuitive justification for IIA
does not apply. Still it would be worth finding out which choice functions
satisfy the IIA condition.
Theorem 4.3 The minimum and the maximum are the only suitable choice
functions which satisfy IIA.
Proof: That the minimum and the maximum satisfy IIA is clear: Suppose
that x is the minimum element of S, and x ∈ T ⊆ S then x is also the
minimum element of T . Similarly, if x is the maximum element of S, and
x ∈ T ⊆ S then x is also the maximum element of T .
Suppose now that f is a suitable choice function other than the minimum and
the maximum. Then the corresponding function s is also not the minimum
or the maximum and there must be an n such that 1 < s(n) < n.
We will now show that f({2, ..., n+1}) must be s(n) as well as s(n)+1, clearly
impossible. Note that s(n + 1) ≤ s(n) + 1 ≤ n and so s(n + 1) ∈ {1, ..., n}.
By IIA, s(n+ 1) must be s(n). Also s(n+ 1) ≥ 2, so s(n+ 1) ∈ {2, ..., n+ 1},
therefore f({2, ..., n+ 1}) = s(n+ 1) = s(n). But {2, ..., n+ 1} is isomorphic
to {1, ..., n} by the successor function, so f({2, ..., n+ 1}) = s(n) + 1. 2
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4.3 Related Work
The issue we have discussed so far is: if a player has preferences among
elements of a certain list, how does that preference translate to preferences
among sublists? In the previous discussion we used a choice function f to
convert an ordering between elements to an ordering between lists. But
the problem has been looked at more abstractly without relying on a choice
function.
Suppose for instance that a voter has preferences among candidates for
an election, how will that translate to preferences among slates of candi-
dates? Two conditions, dominance and independence, which relate prefer-
ences among individual elements to preferences among subsets are discussed
in [42] and [11]. See also [15] and [29].
Let R be a quasi-linear order (i.e., reflexive, transitive, and total) on a set
X and let P be the strict order part of R, i.e. xPy iff xRy ∧ ¬yRx. Let Ξ
be the set of all finite subsets of X and let  be an order on Ξ.  is the
strict part of . For singleton sets, we assume that {x}  {y} iff xRy. So
singletons follow their (unique) elements.
Dominance: For all A ∈ Ξ and x ∈ X
(i) [xPy for all y ∈ A] → A ∪ {x}  A
(ii) [yPx for all y ∈ A] → A  A ∪ {x}
Independence: For all A,B ∈ Ξ, for all x ∈ X − (A ∪B)
44
A  B → A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}
(Note: we are using the symbol “–” also for set subtraction.)
The conditions Dominance and Independence are called (G) and (M) respec-
tively in [42] by Kannai and Peleg who showed that if X has at least six
elements then these very natural conditions are incompatible.
If we use the technique of comparing the minimum, the maximum or the
median as ways of comparing sets, then all three techniques satisfy a weaker
form of the dominance condition.
Weak dominance: For all A ∈ Ξ and x ∈ X
(i) [xPy for all y ∈ A] → A ∪ {x}  A
(ii) [yPx for all y ∈ A] → A  A ∪ {x}
For instance, suppose we say that A  B iff min(A) ≥ min(B) then this
definition of  satisfies both independence and weak dominance. max also
obeys independence and weak dominance.
However, independence fails for all SCFs except the min and the max. Sup-
pose that there is an n such that 1 < s(n) < n. It follows that there is an
n such that s(n) < s(n + 1) = s(n) + 1 < n + 1. (Take the smallest n such
that s(n) < s(n+ 1)). Let m = s(n) and m+ 1 = s(n+ 1).
We will make the proof clearer by an example. Say n = 5, m = 2 (So
the lists in our example will have 5 elements each, and f picks the second
element from each list). We tacitly assume that larger numbers are preferred
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to smaller numbers. Let X = {1, 5, 6, 8, 9} and Y = {1, 4, 7, 8, 9}. Then
clearly f will pick 5 from X and 4 from Y so X will be preferred to Y .
Add 10 to both lists. X ′ = {1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10} and Y ′ = {1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10}. Now
f will pick 6 from X ′ and 7 from Y ′ so Y ′ will be preferred to X ′. Adding
the single element 10 to both X and Y reversed the preference between the
two lists.
4.4 Examples
We now give some applications of the technical work so far.
Example 4.1 The Asian Disease – Tversky and Kahneman 1981
[73]
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs
to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
• If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
• If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
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In this version of the problem, a substantial majority (72%) of 152 respon-
dents favor program A, indicating risk aversion.
Other 155 respondents, selected at random, receive a question in which the
same cover story is followed by a different description of the options:
• If Program A′ is adopted, 400 people will die.
• If Program B′ is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody
will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.
Again, the same question is asked:
Which of the two programs would you favor?
A clear majority (78%) now favor B′.
One way to understand this phenomenon is that the way the problem is
stated causes a change from min-rationality to max-rationality. Programs
A and A′ result in 400 deaths. Programs B and B′ amount to no deaths if
we are lucky and to 600 deaths if we are unlucky. A cautious person would
prefer program A and an aggressive (optimistic) person would prefer B. The
way the question is posed causes a shift from caution to optimism. But both
forms of rationality are ‘rational’.
Example 4.2 Rationality can enter at two different levels. A purely decision
theoretic level, where a single agent is trying to make the ‘best’ choice; or a
game theoretic level where two or more agents are involved, and we not only
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have to think about the ‘rational’ choice but also about what another agent
thinks is the rational choice.
The previous example was in a purely decision theoretic mode. We now
consider how the notion of ‘temperament-based’ rationality can be helpful in
understanding a classic game theoretic example. We consider a player (the
husband) in a state of uncertainty and show how the play is affected by his
temperament.
Figure 7 presents the Bach-Stravinsky game as an extensive form game with
the wife choosing first and the husband next, but we leave it open whether
the husband knows the wife’s choice. We have made the payoffs for Bach-
Stravinsky and Stravinsky-Bach different so that the game is generic.
We consider various scenarios involving the husband’s knowledge and tem-
perament. We assume that the wife knows the husband’s payoffs and tem-
perament and he does not know hers.
Case 1) The husband does not know the wife’s move and she knows this.
a) He is aggressive. Then being aggressive, he will choose S (Stravinsky) for
his move since the highest possible payoff (for him) is 3. Anticipating his
move, she will also choose S, and they will end up with payoffs of (2,3).
b) The husband is conservative. Then not knowing what his wife chose, he
will choose B since the minimum payoff of 1 is better than the minimum
payoff of 0. Anticipating this, the wife will also choose B and they will end
up with (3,2).
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Case 2) Finally if the husband will know what node he is at (and the wife
knows this), then the wife, regardless of the husband’s temperament, will
choose B. The husband will also choose B and they will end up at (3,2).
W
Hl
(3, 2)
B
(0, 0)
S
B
Hr
(1, 1)
B
(2, 3)
S
S
Figure 7: Bach-Stravinsky game in extensive-form with generic payoffs
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5 Knowledge Manipulation
Some of the ideas in this chapter were expressed in a preliminary form in a
conference presentation [56] but the precise semantics was left out. A more
detailed version appeared in [58].
5.1 Two Examples
Providing knowledge is the removal of uncertainty and not providing it means
that some uncertainty will remain. Thus the issue of knowledge is tied inti-
mately with that of action under uncertainty. Sometimes we have to choose
between two or more actions, but lacking information, we are not sure what
outcome will come about as a result of our choice. Chapter 4 has con-
centrated on choices under uncertainty and the properties of various choice
functions. We now turn to the effect of such choice functions and the states
of knowledge on agents’ behavior.
We give two examples of how influencing someone’s knowledge or beliefs
influences their actions.
5.1.1 Three Envelopes
The following example is from Gerbrandy [33].
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Ann has to choose one of three closed envelopes. One en-
velope is empty, one envelope contains three yuan for Ann and
three yuan for Bill, the third contains 6 yuan for Bill (Ann gets
nothing). These facts are commonly known. In addition, Bill
knows which envelope contains the money. Ann has no idea.
In this game, Ann can do no better than to choose an envelope
at random. She may then expect a payoff of 1 yuan, and Bill may
expect 3 (the average of the money in the three envelopes).
Suppose Bill is allowed to communicate with Ann, but only by
saying things that are true (say he communicates via an indepen-
dent referee). What is smart for Bill to say? He could tell Ann
that the second envelope contains 3 yuan for each of them; Ann,
believing him, would then choose this envelope. This particular
communication act secures, but does not improve, Bill’s expected
payoff of 3 yuan. Bill can do better by providing Ann with less
information, and tell her, for example, that it is either the sec-
ond or the third envelope that contains money for both of them,
without specifying which. Ann can now improve her chances by
choosing one of these two envelopes, and Bill can expect a payoff
of 4.5.
Suppose now that there is no referee: there is no way for
Ann to check the truth of what Bill says (apart from opening an
envelope, of course). If Ann is gullible, Bill’s best option is to lie,
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and tell her that there is 3 yuan for her in the third envelope.
So Ann is suspicious of what Bill says. She does not believe
Bill when he says that the third envelope contains 3 yuan for her,
and, by a symmetric argument, she will not believe him either
if he, this time truthfully, claims that it is the second. But she
probably should believe him if he says that it is either the second
or the third: Bill could not possibly gain anything by lying about
this.
5.1.2 Manipulation by Leaking True Information
The following example is from Artemov [3]. Consider the game tree in Fig-
ure 8. Players are A, B and C. The root node A belongs to player A. If A
plays left (L), it is then B’s turn to make a move. If A plays right (R), it is
C’s turn next. The first payoff in each leaf belongs to A, the second one to
B, and the third one to C.
In this game the initial assumption is that all three players are rational but
A is not aware of B’s and C’s rationality. The knowledge based rationality
(KBR) solution by Artemov [2] chooses the move with the highest known
payoff for each player. Therefore it suggests A’s choosing left to secure a
payoff of 2 which is the highest known payoff if she plays left as opposed to
1 if she plays right. Actually, A gets 4 which is more than expected since B
is rational and will play left. Payoff for B, as well as for C, is 2.
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AB
(4, 2, 2)
L
(2, 1, 4)
R
L
C
(3, 4, 3)
L
(1, 3, 1)
R
R
Figure 8: Artemov’s game
However, if B is aware of C’s rationality, at the start of the game he can ma-
nipulate A by (anonymously) leaking the true information that C is rational.
A then knows that C will play left, so he plays right and gets a payoff of
3. In that case the highest expected payoff is the same as A’s actual payoff.
B’s and C’s payoffs will be 4 and 3 respectively, both higher than what they
would get in the initial scenario. Here C does not have an incentive to dis-
close to A that B is also rational, and B ends up with a higher payoff without
making a move. This example demonstrates an interesting principle: more
knowledge yields a higher known payoff but not necessarily a higher actual
payoff. So “nothing but the truth” can be misleading. Knowing “the whole
truth” however, yields a higher actual payoff.
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5.2 Knowledge Creation in Game Theoretic
Situations
5.2.1 Our Model
In our model we have a number of active players as well as a knowledge
manipulator (KM). The knowledge manipulator arranges for the players to
have certain restricted amounts of knowledge, both about the situation and
about the knowledge of the other players. But she makes no moves herself.
When the game ends, all the players including KM receive payoffs.
As we show later, our games could be reduced to more familiar forms treating
KM as yet another active player. We choose not to do that since the role of
the manipulator in real life is different, whether we are speaking about Julian
Assange revealing certain secret messages or the government of some country
restricting access to the internet. Iago in Shakespeare’s play Othello is also a
knowledge manipulator, although what he supplies to Othello is false beliefs
rather than knowledge. It is important that Othello trusts Iago rather than
questioning his motives. So in this chapter, we will assume that the active
players do not concern themselves with the motives of KM.
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5.2.2 Abstract Considerations
Let us consider a game tree for two8 players with a set A of nodes, divided
into A1, the set of nodes where player 1 moves, A2 where player 2 moves,
and T the set of terminal nodes, so that A is the disjoint union of A1, A2,
and T . Moreover payoff functions p1 and p2 are defined on T . To simplify
matters we will usually assume that both p1 and p2 are 1-1. (i.e., the payoffs
at distinct leaves are distinct, i.e., the tree is generic.)
In that case we know that if we have a perfect information game, then
backward induction yields a unique way in which the game is played, and
according to Aumann, that will indeed be the way the game will be played
if there is common knowledge of rationality, see [9, 3].
But of course a perfect information game might be played differently from
an imperfect information game with the same structure, same moves, and
the same payoffs. As we saw in Example 4.2, this matters, because someone
who can manipulate the knowledge of others can also affect the way they
play some particular game. If the game has payoffs not only for the active
players, but also for KM, then KM will seek to manipulate the active players’
knowledge in such a way as to maximize her own payoff.
8The number two has no special significance and is only used to simplify notation.
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5.2.3 Representing Knowledge, A Third Model: History-
Based Semantics
Before we explain how KM can create the knowledge states of the active play-
ers, we will briefly discuss another model that is commonly used to represent
knowledge: History-based models. We have already covered the set theoret-
ical definition of knowledge and Kripke structures in Section 2.1. While the
former uses information partitions and the latter uses accessibility relations
to model static knowledge, history-based structures can represent evolving
knowledge which we need for our applications.
We will now consider an abstract extensional presentation of a game with
communication in which the game is described as a set of global histories,
each of which represents one possible system evolution given by a sequence
of global events. A global history is all that happens. The individual players
only see their own local history which is their own perception of the global
history. For each system, the set of players who participate in the play is
assumed to be a fixed finite set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} (KM is not a member of
this set.) Similarly, for each game, the set E of possible events is fixed and
consists of signals for the individual players, n-tuples of signals (sent by KM)
and moves (by the actual players). This material is adapted from [54].
The set of global histories E∗ is the set of all finite sequences over E. H,H ′
etc. denote elements of E∗. We will let H  H ′ denote that H is a prefix of
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H ′. We write H;H ′ or just HH ′ to denote the concatenation of the history
H with the history H ′. When H is of length ≥ k, we let Hk denote the prefix
of H consisting of the first k elements. For a set H of histories, let P(H)
denote the set {H ′ | H ′  H for some H ∈ H} containing all prefixes of
sequences in H.
Definition 5.1 A system is a tuple S = (H, d1, . . . , dn), where H ⊆ E∗ (our
protocol ) is the set of all possible histories of S, and for i ∈ [n], di: P(E∗)→
E∗ is the projection map for i. Hi def= {di(H) | H ∈ P(H)} is the set of
local histories of i.
Local histories di(H) are got by ‘projecting’ global histories H to local com-
ponents. Each player sees her own moves and when KM sends out an n-tuple
of signals, player i sees the i-th component of that n-tuple. Thus if (s1, ..., sn)
is the n-tuple signal sent out by KM at some node of the game tree, player i
only sees si. She may infer some sj, but only if si occurs only in conjunction
with sj.
Definition 5.2 Let H,H ′ be global histories in H. For i ∈ [n], define H ∼i
H ′ iff di(H) = di(H ′).
∼i is an equivalence relation, and it gives the indistinguishability relation for
i. We can consider this relation as giving the information partition for i in
the system S; that is, given the information available to i, the histories H
and H ′ cannot be distinguished.
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The properties of such systems can be studied in a logical language. Let L
be a language which has formulae expressing (time dependent) properties of
global histories. Then we can write Hk |= A, for A belonging to L, to mean
that the history H satisfies formula A at stage k. We expand L to a larger
language LK by closing under boolean connectives and operators Ki and C.
Thus if A is a formula of LK and i is a player, then Ki(A), meaning i knows
A, and C(A), meaning A is common knowledge are also in LK.
We can then define Hk |= Ki(A) to hold if for all m and all H ′ ∈ H, if
H ′m ∼i Hk then H ′m |= A. What player i knows at stage k depends on his
local history. 9 Moreover, the laws of logic LK5 (the S5 version of the logic
of knowledge) are valid.
If P = {p0, p1, . . .} is a countable set of atomic propositions. then the syntax
of the logic is given by:
φ, ψ ∈ LK ::= p ∈ P | ¬φ | φ ∨ ψ | Kiφ | C(φ)
A model is a pair M = (S, pi), where pi : P(H) → 2P is a valuation map on
finite prefixes of global histories which gives the truth values of some atomic
predicates at the states. We can now inductively define the notion Hk |= φ,
for H ∈ H, k ≥ 0 and φ ∈ LK:
1. Hk |= p iff p ∈ pi(Hk), for p ∈ P .
9We can define Hk |= C(A) analogously using the reflexive transitive closure of
⋃ ∼i.
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2. Hk |= ¬φ iff Hk 6|= φ.
3. Hk |= φ ∨ ψ iff Hk |= φ or Hk |= ψ.
4. Hk |= Kiφ iff for all m ≥ 0, for all H ′ ∈ H such that Hk ∼i H ′m,
H ′m |= φ.
Also see [37] for a discussion of topics similar to what is found in this section.
5.3 Creating Knowledge States
Now we return to the topic of our particular application of history based
structures and develop a model specifically designed for that application.
How would KM create a knowledge situation? One way that KM can create
such a situation is, at each node she sends signals to the active players.
The signal function S, whose values are sets of n-tuples of signals is common
knowledge. The signal function does not usually determine the actual signals
that KM sends but only a set of possible tuples of signals she can send. When
sending, she picks a particular n-tuple of signals, where n is the number of
active players.
Based on the signal he receives, an active player can infer something about
the node he is at. Suppose that at some node, KM could send one of the
three pairs of signals (x, y), (x, z), (u, v) and that this fact is common knowl-
edge. Then, when player 1 receives an x she does not know whether player
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2 received a y or a z, whereas if she receives a u she does know that player 2
received a v. On the other hand, player 2 can infer player 1’s signal from his
own. We shall later see how such facts can be used to create complex states
of knowledge.
So we augment a history-based model with signal functions. In this model,
only the active players make moves and only KM sends signals. A history
is basically a sequence of moves by players and signals sent by KM. Each
active player perceives his own local history consisting of his own moves and
the particular signals received by him.
Definition 5.3 A game tree τ with signal function is a standard extensive-
form game tree with a set of nodes A, along with a set of signals Σ and a
signal function S : A → P(Σn) where n is the number of players and P
stands for the power set.
The associated protocol H(A) consists of all sequences
(a1, σ1, a2, σ2, . . . , ak−1, σk−1, ak) ∈ (A× Σn)∗ × A
such that a1, . . . , ak is a path in the game tree starting at the root, for all
i < k, ai+1 is a child of ai, and σi ∈ S(ai) for each 1 ≤ i < k.
We define a node function N : H(A)→ 2A by setting
N(a1, σ1, . . . , ak−1, σk−1, ak, σk) := N(a1, σ1, . . . , ak−1, σk−1, ak) := ak
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For each σi = (s1, . . . , sn), player j observes sj and moreover the player
observes all the moves which were his own.10
Definition 5.4 We define the set of histories for a game tree with signal
function as follows. (For simplicity of notation we assume that the tree is a
full binary tree, with two branches at each node and all branches of the same
length. Thus all moves will be labeled L and R). A history is an element of
(A× Σn × {L,R})∗ × A
i.e. something which looks like
((a1, σ1, d1), (a2, σ2, d2) . . . , (ak−1, σk−1, dk−1), (ak, σk, dk))
which we might write simply as
(a1, σ1, d1, a2, σ2, d2 . . . , ak−1, σk−1, dk−1, ak, σk, dk)
We do not insist that a sequence end with some dk as prefixes of allowed
histories also have to be allowed.
Here each di is a member of {L,R}, and σi is an element of S(ai). Two
sequences α1, α2 are equivalent
11 for agent j, if j receives the same signal
10Note that the node function N does not have to do with payoffs and ak need not be
a terminal node.
11These sequences α etc are playing the same role as the Hk of the previous subsection.
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from KM at each stage p (i.e. (σp)j is the same in both cases) and moreover
at each stage p in α1 and α2 if it was j’s move then j made the same move
from {L,R}.
The set of histories themselves as just defined can be seen as nodes of another
(much larger) tree than the game tree. Let H(τ) be this second tree. We
will call this H(τ) the history-based tree corresponding to τ . A physical node
a of τ can correspond to two or more nodes α1, α2, ..., αk in H(τ) where
N(α1) = N(α2) = ... = N(αk).
Figure 9.a shows an example of a game tree, and Figure 9.b shows a history-
based tree corresponding to 9.a. Here KM might send any of the two different
signal pairs σ1, σ2 at α1 and the two different signal pairs σ3, σ4 at β1. We
should note that under the node function N , a corresponds to all of α1, α2, α3.
Similarly for b and the three β’s. (i.e. N(α1) = N(α2) = N(α3) = a, and
N(β1) = N(β2) = N(β3) = b)
Pradeep Dubey [22] has remarked that if we see KM as an additional active
player and interpreting her signals as moves, a knowledge based game can be
understood as a conventional game of partial information with information
sets. However, we should note that in our framework, information sets over
nodes are defined not only for the player who is making the move but for all
active players.
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xa
(3, 2)
L
(0, 0)
R
L
b
(1, 1)
L
(2, 3)
R
R
(9.a) Game tree τ1
χ
α1
α2
(3, 2)
L
(0, 0)
R
σ1
α3
(3, 2)
L
(0, 0)
R
σ2
L
β1
β2
(1, 1)
L
(2, 3)
R
σ3
β3
(1, 1)
L
(2, 3)
R
σ4
R
(9.b) A history-based tree H(τ1) corresponding to τ1
Figure 9: A game tree and a history-based tree corresponding to it
5.4 States of Knowledge
We described a model for representing a game with possibly complex signal
functions.
Let ∆ be the set of nodes of a history-based game tree H(τ). By abuse of
language, we refer to A, the set of nodes of τ , as N(∆). We stipulate that for
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each element a ∈ N(∆), a is also an atomic formula which is true precisely
when the play is at the (physical) node a, i.e. it is true at node α of H(τ) iff
N(α) = a. Since there are several nodes α with the same N(α) = a, a will
be true at all of them, but knowledge states, before receiving a signal from
KM and after receiving that signal will of course be different. When we talk
about KM sending a signal, of course she sends such a signal at the first α
such that N(α) = a.
We created a formal language LK by closing under truth functions, operators
K1, K2 and the operator C. (Here K1 means that 1 knows, K2 means that 2
knows, and C stands for common knowledge).
Then a perfect information game is simply a game where formulas of the
form a→ C(a) are true at all α such that N(α) = a.
Consider an actual play of a game with two players 1 and 2 and where the
formula K1(a) ∧K2(a) holds at some realized nodes α such that N(α) = a,
but for instance K1K2(a) does not hold at those nodes. At those α’s, where
they have received the signal, both players know what node it is but they do
not know that the other knows. Now, in order for this to work, clearly the
formula a→ (K1(a)∧K2(a)) cannot be common knowledge. This means that
KM had the option of sending each player at each node a signal revealing
that node, but KM also had other options so that a player receiving such a
signal knows which node she is at but does not know what signal another
player received and hence whether the other player knows which node he is
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at. (We will see an actual example later.)
Then with (K1(a) ∧K2(a)), both players know which node they are at. But
if 1 had made a choice between L and R, 2 knows which choice 1 made, but 1
did not know that 2 would know. Thus 1 might well play differently. So it is
not a perfect information game, strictly speaking. Yet we cannot indicate the
‘imperfection’ by indicating information sets, for both players know where
they are and the information sets would be singletons. We illustrate this by
means of the following example. 12
Example 5.1 Figure 10 illustrates a Kripke structure Mα at node α. The
set of states is {α, α′, α′′, β, γ}. The actual state is α. We have a in states
α, α′ and α′′. We have b 6= a in β, and c 6= a in γ. Even though state α′
will not be arrived at, at the actual state α, 1 considers it possible, and even
though 1 knows that β will not be arrived at, she considers that 2 considers
it possible, etc. In this case, both players know that they are at node a, but
they do not know that the other player knows.
To represent such situations, we modify the knowledge requirement. We
stipulate that with each node α is associated a Kripke structure Mα with
two knowers 1 and 2. Such a Kripke structure would represent a complex
state of partial knowledge on the part of the players.
Let M−α be the unpointed structure corresponding to Mα. We will assume
12Note that the Roman letters a, b etc refer to the nodes of the game tree, Greek letters
α, β etc refer to the nodes of the corresponding history-based tree.
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α
a
1
2
◦
OO
γ c
1
◦α
′
a
2//oo ◦β
b
//oo
Figure 10: Kripke structure Mα associated with node α
that the map α;M−α is common knowledge. In [54] terms this means that
the protocol, or which plays and signals are possible is common knowledge.
Each player will also know the block from her partition that includes the
actual state. Thus if α is the actual state of the pointed Kripke structure
Mα, then player i will know M
−
α as well as the set {δ : α ∼i δ}. In the
example above, at state α, 1 will know that the actual state is in {α, α′} and
2 will know that the actual state is in {α, α′′}.
Thus the class of knowledge situations we can consider is more general than
perfect information games or games whose imperfection can be indicated
simply by information sets.
We define an extended knowledge-based game (or KB-game) as a history-
based game supplemented by such a function Mα. As we noted, a perfect
information game is (can be seen as) a special case of such a KB-game. For
in that case, for each α, with N(α) = a, the structure Mα has a single state
satisfying a and no other states are accessible to any player.
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Can every knowledge-based game arise from a history-based game? Not
so, because in a knowledge-based game we do not account for the fact that
players retain knowledge of where they were at some previous stage, a nec-
essary consequence of the fact that a player who knows his local history also
knows his previous local histories. If a player knew that he was at some
node a = N(α) then he must know now that he is at some node b which is
a descendent of a. Thus if b = N(β), there are obvious limitations on what
M−β could be given what M
−
α was.
13
However, at least in one-shot situations, KM has enormous power to create
states of knowledge:
Theorem 5.1 Any knowledge situation represented by a finite Kripke struc-
ture M can be created in a single signaling step.
Proof: The knowledge manipulator (KM) picks a world w in M and sends
player i the signal (M,Xwi ) where X
w
i = {v|wRiv} and Ri is the accessibility
relation of player i. This tells us the local history of i. The global history Hw
is (M,w,Xw1 , ..., X
w
n ). An atomic formula p holds at Hw iff it holds at w. We
now show by induction on the complexity of the formula F that M,w |= F
iff Hw |= F where we use the [54] history-based semantics to define Hw |= F
We have already noticed that atomic formulas behave correctly (by stipula-
tion) and truth functions are clear. Consider F = Ki(B).
13The situation would be different if, like the inhabitants of Gulliver’s Laputa, the players
were forgetful and had to be reminded all the time of past events.
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• M,w |= Ki(B) iff
• (∀v)(wRiv →M, v |= B) iff
• (IH) (∀v)(wRiv → Hv |= B) iff
• (∀Hv)(di(Hv) = di(Hw)→ Hv |= B)
• iff Hw |= Ki(B)
We recall that di is the projection for i of a global history, and two histories
Hw, Hv here have the same projection for i iff X
w
i = X
v
i iff wRiv 2
5.5 Using Knowledge Manipulation
W
Hl
(3, 2)
B
(0, 0)
S
B
Hr
(1, 1)
B
(2, 3)
S
S
Figure 11: Bach-Stravinsky game in extensive-form with generic payoffs
Example 5.2 We consider now the question of how KM can create the
various knowledge scenarios of Example 4.2. KM is capable of creating these
situations by means of signals, as well as another one we did not mention
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where the husband does not know the wife’s move, and the wife does not
know that he will not.
The game is shown again in Figure 11. We assume that the wife moves first
and the husband after. Thus the payoffs are in the form (wp, hp) where wp
refers to the wife’s payoff and hp to the husband’s.
• Case 1. The husband does not know the wife’s move and she knows
this.
• Case 2. The husband will know what node he is at and the wife knows
this.
• Case 3. We will also consider a third case where the husband does not
know the wife’s move but the wife does not know that he will not.
For case 1, KM can associate the signal tuple (l, a) with the wife’s left move
(i.e. KM sends the wife an l, and the husband an a if the wife moves left),
and the signal tuple (r, a) with the right (i.e. KM sends the wife an r, and
the husband an a if the wife moves right). In this case after the wife moves
and KM sends the signals, the wife knows (if she did not already) which node
they are at, but the husband will not, all he gets is the uninformative a in
both cases.
For case 2, KM can associate the tuple (l, l) with the wife’s left move, and
(r, r) with the right. After the signals are sent, both players will know which
node they are at, and this fact will be common knowledge. (Note that it is
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also possible to have the signal function such that the husband knows what
node he is at, the wife knows that he knows, but the husband doesn’t know
that the wife knows he knows.)
Finally, for case 3, if KM wants the wife to be in doubt whether the husband
knows, she could associate two signals {(l, l), (l, a)} with the wife’s left move,
and two other signals {(r, r), (r, a)} with her right move. Then if the wife
chose left and receives an l, she will not know if the husband got an l or the
neutral a. If KM sends (l, l) then the husband will know what node he is at,
but will also know that his wife did not know whether he would know.
We have not indicated KM’s utilities above. They could appear as a third
component of the payoff function. When the game finishes, all three players
including KM receive their payoffs and so KM has an interest in seeing to
it that the game is played in a certain way. She can do this, to a limited
extent, by influencing the structures Ma.
We return to the case where KM wants the wife to be in doubt whether
the husband knows. Recall that she could associate two signals {(l, l), (l, a)}
with the wife’s left move and two other signals {(r, r), (r, a)} with her right
move.
Thus KM could have two moves for each of the wife’s moves. After her move
B, KM could have a move corresponding to the signal pair (l, l) and another
move corresponding to the signal pair (l, a). Similarly after her S move, KM
could have a move corresponding to the signal pair (r, r) and another move
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corresponding to the signal pair (r, a). This gives us four nodes corresponding
to the moves by the wife and KM, and let us denote them in the natural way
as LL,LR,RL and RR.
The nodes LL,LR are indistinguishable for the wife and similarly RL and
RR. She knows what she moved, but does not know what the husband got.
The husband cannot distinguish between LR and RR, because in the signal
description he got an a in either case. But the other two, LL and RL are
singletons for him. If he gets an l or an r he knows how the wife moved.
This construction is illustrated in Figure 12.
W
Wa
LL
(3, 2)
B
(0, 0)
S
(l, l)
LR
(3, 2)
B
(0, 0)
S
(l, a)
B
Wb
RL
(1, 1)
B
(2, 3)
S
(r, r)
RR
(1, 1)
B
(2, 3)
S
(r, a)
S
Figure 12: Bach-Stravinsky game with KM’s signals as moves
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5.5.1 An Example of Manipulation
Let us consider the game in Figure 13, first without KM’s moves included.
Player 1 has three moves: A, B and C, and player 2 has two moves: L and
R. The payoffs at the leaf nodes are for player 1 and player 2 respectively.
W
Wa
(3, 3)
L
(−1,−1)
R
A
Wb
(4, 2)
L
(1, 1)
R
B
Wc
(0, 0)
L
(2, 4)
R
C
Figure 13: Another game tree
KM may choose to make this game a perfect information game by using the
signal tuples shown in Figure 14. That is, KM sends the signal tuple (a, a)
if player 1 moves A, the tuple (b, b) if she plays B, and the tuple (c, c) if she
plays C. In this case, the backward induction solution will apply: Knowing
that player 2 will know what node he will be at, player 1 will play B; KM will
send the signal pair (b, b) making player 1’s move common knowledge, and
player 2 will play L. Payoffs for the active players will be 4 and 2 respectively.
KM may also choose to use the signal structure in Figure 15. In this version
of the game, it is common knowledge that if player 1 plays A, this fact will be
common knowledge. (Both players associate the signal a only with the move
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WWa
W1
(3, 3)
L
(−1,−1)
R
(a, a)
A
Wb
W2
(4, 2)
L
(1, 1)
R
(b, b)
B
Wc
W3
(0, 0)
L
(2, 4)
R
(c, c)
C
Figure 14: KM turns the game into a perfect information game
A). If player 1 chooses to play B or C, KM will leave player 2 in uncertainty
by sending him an x.
W
Wa
W1
(3, 3)
L
(−1,−1)
R
(a, a)
A
Wb
W2
(4, 2)
L
(1, 1)
R
(b, x)
B
Wc
W3
(0, 0)
L
(2, 4)
R
(c, x)
C
Figure 15: KM gives away some information but leaves the game as an
imperfect information game
So how might the active players play this game? We will assume that both
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players are conservative and that this is common knowledge.
We can start with player 1’s reasoning:
• If she (player 1) plays A, KM will send (a, a), and player 2, knowing
what node he is at, will play L. The payoffs will be (3, 3).
• If she plays B, KM will send (b, x), player 2 will not know if he is at
W2 or W3. Playing L brings him a minimum of 0 whereas playing R
brings him a minimum of 1. He will play R, and the payoffs will be (1,
1).
• If she plays C, KM will send (c, x), player 2 will again not know where
he is. With the same reasoning he will play R, and the payoffs will be
(2, 4).
So if player 1 is a conservative player, she will choose to play A, which secures
her a payoff of 3, higher than the secured payoffs with B and C.
In the original game, B dominates A for player 1 in the usual game theoretic
sense, however in this case it makes sense for player 1 not to eliminate the
move A without seeing KM’s signal structure first.
Given that both players are conservative, and that this is commonly known,
both players can reduce the game to the form in Figure 16 after learning KM’s
signal structure. In this reduced form, the move A is no longer dominated
for player 1.
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WWa
W1
(3, 3)
L
(a, a)
A
Wb
W2
(4, 2)
L
(1, 1)
R
(b, x)
B
Wc
W3
(0, 0)
L
(2, 4)
R
(c, x)
C
Figure 16: The reduced game
5.5.2 Can KM Always Create Uncertainty?
Consider again the game in Figure 12. In this extended game, if player 1
simulates player 2’s reasoning, she gets the following:
• If she (player 1) plays B and KM sends (l, l), player 2 will play B. The
payoffs will be (3, 2).
• If she plays B and KM sends (l, a), player 2 will play B in order to
secure himself a payoff of 1. However, the actual payoffs will be (3, 2).
• If she plays S and KM sends (r, r), player 2 will play S. The payoffs
will be (2, 3).
• If she plays S and KM sends (r, a), player 2 will play B in order to
secure himself a payoff of 1. The payoffs will be (1,1).
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We should note that the signaling function is intended to see to it that player
2 will not know which node he is at if he gets the signal a. But there is an
issue: Player 2 himself is also able to perform all this reasoning. So if he
does get the signal a, will he not be able to deduce that he must be at node
LR after all?
It might not be so. Player 2 can start his reasoning by checking player 1’s
payoffs first. Since with the given signal structure player 1 cannot know if
player 2 will know which node he is at, she (player 1) might choose to play
S which secures her a payoff of 1 as opposed to the secured payoff of 0 with
the move B.
So when player 2 does get the signal a from KM, he indeed cannot know
which node he is at.
However, KM is not always able to create uncertainty. One such case is when
both players have a move that dominates their all other moves. Consider the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game in extensive-form in Figure 17:
In this game, if both players are conservative (or aggressive) they will play
D. Then even if KM tries to create uncertainty for player 2 by sending him
an x in both Wc and Wd, player 2 will know that player 1 must have played
D and therefore he must be at node W2.
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WWc
W1
(3, 3)
C
(0, 5)
D
(c, x)
C
Wd
W2
(5, 0)
C
(1, 1)
D
(d, x)
D
Figure 17: Prisoner’s Dilemma in extensive-form with signals
5.5.3 Predicting the Play
Can KM always predict how a game will be played in a less than perfect
information state which she has brought about? This is indeed true in a
decision theoretic situation if the temperament of the player is known to
KM.14 For instance a conservative agent faced with uncertainty will choose
the least risky alternative. And since we assume that no two outcomes have
the same value, the least risky alternative will always be well defined and
known to KM.
In two-person games with imperfect information, there may not be a unique
way that the players will play, therefore KM may not be able to predict how
they will indeed play. In particular the reasoning process of the players can
14By decision theoretic we mean that there is only one agent apart from KM, who has
a decision theoretic problem to solve.
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be order-dependent, as we have seen in Section 5.5.2.
Theorem 5.2 If player 2 does not know player 1’s payoffs but player 1 does
know player 2’s payoffs, then (given their temperaments) there is a unique
solution to the game.
Proof: Although our examples do take this form, we do not assume that
player 2 always plays after 1. For instance player 2 could start the game15
or the game may be over more than two stages in which case we would have
both agents playing after each other.
At any particular node, an f -rational player 2 has a set of nodes X which
he might be at. He considers all possible strategies s of player 1 which are
compatible with their presently being at a node in X. For each such s he
considers various strategies s′ which he himself could play and the payoff
p(s, s′) to himself of s, s′. Then he chooses that s′ for which f({p(s, s′)|s ∈
X}) is highest. This defines the strategy s′ of 2 as a function of the node.
Player 1 can simulate player 2’s reasoning and plays so as to maximize her
own payoff. This yields a unique outcome.
Note that since player 2 does not know player 1’s payoffs, he is not able now
to think of a proper response to player 1’s choice - he has no idea what it is.
So there is no ‘cycle of reasoning’. 2
More generally, with two or more players, if the players are linearly ordered
15It is worth noting that unlike chess, in the Japanese game of Go the black player
starts.
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so that no player knows the payoffs of any player above him then there is a
unique solution.
5.5.4 A Note on Normal Form Games: Correlated Equi-
librium
Unlike the rest of the chapter, we do assume cardinal utilities here. Given
that assumption, it makes sense to talk of mixed strategies. In a correlated
equilibrium, players play co-ordinated strategies [8, 6]. Consider for instance
the Bach-Stravinsky game in Figure 18, where the wife is the row player and
the husband is the column player.
Bach Stravinsky
Bach 2, 1 0, 0
Stravinsky 0, 0 1, 2
Figure 18: Bach-Stravinksy game in normal form
The players can play mixed strategies [47]. 2/3 Bach and 1/3 Stravinsky for
the wife, and 1/3 Bach (B) and 2/3 Stravinsky (S) for the husband. This
yields an expected payoff of 2/3 for each.
However, if they can co-ordinate, with (B, B) half of the time, and (S, S)
half of the time, then they will get an average payoff of 3/2.
How is this correlation to be achieved? Suppose there is a co-ordinator
(knowledge manipulator) who tosses a coin and when it is heads, she in-
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forms both that it is B and when it is tails she informs both that it is S. This
works, if the manipulator is honest.
We can consider yet another variation. Let us say that the manipulator is
not 100% honest and that this fact is known to the active players. Moreover,
suppose that the manipulator has her own payoff of 1 at cell (B, S), and 0 in
every other cell as shown in Figure 19, and that all of this is also known to
the active players.
Bach Stravinsky
Bach 2, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
Stravinsky 0, 0, 0 1, 2, 0
Figure 19: Bach-Stravinsky game with knowledge manipulator
Then she has the incentive to deceive and occasionally send a B to the wife
and an S to the husband.
Is this deception risk free? Only if she does not deceive too much. If she
signals (B, B) with probability 2/9 + , (S, S) with probability 2/9 + 
and (B, S) with probability 5/9 - 2 then she has an expected value of 5/9
- 2 and the wife and husband are still better off than if they had played
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Their expected payoff will be strictly
more than 2/3. In that case, even though the wife and the husband know
the manipulator is not 100% honest, they would still trust her signals.
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5.6 Related Work
A very interesting approach loosely related to ours is described by Kamien,
Tauman and Zamir [41] who refer to our knowledge manipulator as the
maven. They describe the following puzzle.
A card is randomly picked of one of two colors red and black. Player A is
asked to guess the color. After A announces his choice, B is asked to make a
guess. The utilities are 5 for the one who guesses correctly if the other does
not, and 0 for the one who didn’t guess correctly; 2 for each if both guess
correctly; and 0 for both if neither guesses correctly. It is easy to see that in
the absence of information A should guess randomly and B should guess a
different color. The expected value is 2.5 for each.
Suppose however that an informed person KM, the maven, shows the card to
A and B knows that A has seen the card. Then A’s best move is to announce
the correct color and B’s best move is to announce the same. The expected
utility for both (and hence for A) has dropped from 2.5 to 2.
It appears that the knowledge has harmed A, contrary to the intuition that
the more one knows, the better off one is. But note that A is actually harmed
by the fact that B knows that A has learned. In a subsequent paper, Neyman
[49] shows that if A’s knowledge is increased while leaving everything else the
same, then A is indeed better off.
Other work like that of Brandenburger et al [17] is also relevant but unlike
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us they rely on cardinal utilities. They also do not speak about actual ma-
nipulation of behavior by limiting knowledge. Other relevant references are
[14, 59, 21].
5.7 Discussion
Our framework allows KM to make public as well as certain types of pri-
vate announcements. A player can learn new information without the others
knowing what information she has learned. However, with the signal struc-
ture being common knowledge, KM cannot make private announcements
where a player gets information without the other players being aware of the
fact that she received some information. We would expect that if KM is
allowed to manipulate the game with private announcements of the second
kind, she can achieve more (in terms of manipulating the game) since the
other players would not be able to reason about an announcement they are
unaware of.
In the setup we investigated, there is only one knowledge manipulator who,
moreover, is trusted by the other players. But we can also consider variants.
One possibility is where the manipulator is manipulative. Her payoff function
is known to other players, and they are aware that they cannot fully trust
her. This is the direction of cheap talk [26].
We can also consider the case where every player is both an actor and an in-
former. This case could be investigated by enriching the purely informational
82
structure of [54] and augmenting it with actions.
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